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Was Occupational Health and Safety a Strike Issue? Workers, Unions and 
the Body in Twentieth-Century Scotland 
In February 1949, 5,000 or so asbestos miners downed tools and went on strike in 
a dispute which centred on excessively dusty working conditions which were 
considered inimical to the health of those breathing this toxic mineral into their 
lungs. This occurred in the mining town called Asbestos in Quebec, Canada, 
ZKHUH,ULVKPLJUDQWVZHUHDPRQJVWWKHVWULNH¶VSDUWLFLSDQWV7KH&DWKROLF&KXUFK
was drawn into the conflict, with the nearby Archbishop of Montreal supporting 
the strikers and organising fund-raising which quickly accumulated over 
$500,000. After a long, bitter and violent five-month struggle the strike was 
defeated and the men returned to working in the dust. Two decades or so later, in 
the 1970s, the legacy was evident in uncontroversial medical evidence of spikes in 
asbestos-related disease deaths amongst Canadian asbestos miners.1 
This episode is revealing because it appears to be such a rare occurrence: a 
ZRUNHUV¶VWULNHH[SOLFLWO\RYHURFFXSDWLRQDOKHDOWKZKHUHDVXEVWDQWLDOQXPEHURI
employees were responding directly to the threat towards their bodies of the 
labour process, the work environment and the materials on which they worked. 
How many other such examples can we think of? Such strikes appear to be 
outliers; few and far between on both sides of the Atlantic, despite the heavy toll 
on the body that came with industrialisation. The big industrial struggles in 
                                                          
1
 See Jessica van Horssen,µ ³¬IDLUHXQSHXGHSRXVVLqUH´(QYLURnmental Health and the Asbestos 
6WULNHRI¶Labour/LeTravail, 70 (2012) in Pierre Elliot Trudeau (ed.), The Asbestos Strike 
(Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1974), 101-132. 
Britain and North America have been over wages and the protection of jobs, with 
working conditions playing a supplementary role and occupational health hardly 
evident ± at least explicitly. In the United States of America one survey in 1980, 
at a high point in trade union power and strike proneness, calculated that a 
miniscule 0.7 per cent of all strikes were deemed to have been caused by health 
and safety issues.2 In Britain, strikes caused by grievances over µZRUNFRQGLWLRQV¶
accounted for between 5-8 per cent of all strikes in the 1960s and 1970s: health 
and safety strikes would have only been a proportion of this number.3 The key 
legislative changes in preventative legislation and compensation in Britain, such 
as the WoUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ$FWVDQGH[WHQGHGSHULRGLFDOO\
thereafter), the Industrial Injuries Act (1946) and the Health and Safety at Work 
$FWZHUHWKHSURGXFWVRIZLGHSDUW\µDOOLDQFH¶FDPSDLJQVWRZKLFKWUDGH
union campaigning contributed significantly, though to varying degrees. 
However, they were not the result of sustained and targeted industry-wide strikes, 
or other collective action, such as work to rules. Historically, evolution of the UK 
workplace regulatory code in the Factory and Mines Acts and the scheduling of 
new industrial diseases also tended to correlate closely to industrial disasters, to 
breakthroughs in medical knowledge, or they were the product of multi-
stakeholder political campaigning. These were important arenas of trade union 
DFWLRQDVZRUNRQWKHµKHDOWK\IDFWRU\¶E\VVLQRVLVVLOLFRVLVDQGµPLQHUVOXQJ¶
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 US Bureau of Labour Statistics data cited in Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Brown, Workers at 
Risk: Voices from the Workplace (Chicago, 1984), 121. 
3
 Philip B. Beaumont, Safety at Work and the Unions (London, 1983), 50. 
have shown.4 However, this was through bargaining, advocacy, political and 
pressure group activity within a legislative framework, rather than deploying the 
deterrent use of threats of direct action of labour withdrawal. 
If it was the case that health and safety strikes were rare, why was this? 
Why did workers not more readily down tools, as at Asbestos, Quebec, to protect 
their bodies from the carnage of industrial accidents, disasters and chronic 
occupational ill-health? What does this tell us about structures of power, 
prevailing attitudes towards risk and work-health cultures? Does this evident 
inaction represent a prioritisation of job security and protection of earnings and a 
concomitant failure on the part of workers and their trade unions to prioritise 
protection of the body at work? If so, why were bodies not valued more? 
Moreover, where direct action did take place, why was this and in what 
circumstances? This essay explores these questions, aiming to extend the 
conversation about resistance and agency on occupational health and safety on 
which there is now a growing literature. It will offer explanations for health not 
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being visible in industrial conflict nationally and historically whilst arguing that 
there has been a long if uneven history of protest and resistance centred around 
the body. This has been particularly apparent in local and unofficial strike action, 
especially in the so-FDOOHGµGDQJHURXVWUDGHV¶)UDJPHQWDU\WKRXJKLWLVWKLV
evidence suggests that there is potential for further research in a refocused history 
of direct action in relation to the body at work and that in the light of this we need 
WRUHYLVHDQ\FRQFHSWWKDWWKHWUDGHXQLRQVVRPHKRZµIDLOHG¶WKHLUPHPEHUVLQ
relation to protecting bodies from trauma, overstrain and long-term chronic 
disease. This article focuses on developments in Scotland in the twentieth century 
and, amongst other sources, draws upon oral interview evidence. 
Workers and Campaigning around the Body  
Historically, and compared to others in the UK, Scottish workers were both more 
militant and strike-prone in the twentieth century and faced relatively high levels 
of injury and ill-health at work.5 7KLVKDVEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDVµWKH6FRWWLVK
DQRPDO\¶E\WKH+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\([HFXWLYH+6(. Various explanations have 
been offered for more dangerous workplaces and higher levels of working days 
lost from industrial accidents and chronic occupational diseases, such as 
pneumoconiosis and asbestos-related disease in Scotland, linked to a range of 
structural and cultural factors. The main problems occurred in the Clydeside 
LQGXVWULDOFRQXUEDWLRQZKHUHPRUHGDQJHURXVµKHDY\¶LQGXVWULHVVXFKDVFRDO
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 See Gregor Gall and Mike -DFNVRQµ6WULNH$FWLYLW\LQ6FRWODQG¶Scottish Labour History, 33 
(1998), 97-112; Roy Church and Quentin Outram, Strikes and Solidarity: Coalfield Conflict in 
Britain, 1889-1966 (Cambridge, 1998). 
mining, iron and steel manufacture and shipbuilding were clustered. Irish workers 
also appear to have faced inordinately high levels of danger in the workplace. Up 
to the1980s they were more than twice as likely as English workers to be killed at 
work and International Labour Organisation data suggests there still remained in 
the 2000s around a 30 per cent additional risk in Ireland compared to the British 
average.6 Given this relatively high risk workplace environment, it is surprising 
that occupational health and safety has attracted so little attention in Irish labour 
historiography. Francis Devine has also made the point that occupational health 
and safety has hardly featured historically in trade union campaigns and agendas 
LQ,UHODQGEHLQJµVLGHOLQHG¶DVKHSXWLWDWOHDVWXQWLOYHU\UHFHQWO\7 There is 
much scope for further research here. 
In Britain, campaigning on health and safety at work was widespread and 
has long historical antecedents. Fatigue and overstrain, for example, lay behind 
concerted trade union attempts to control working hours which included the 
shorter working hours campaigns of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
in which the cotton textile unions played a prominent part. The discourse of 
µRYHUZRUN¶ZDVDOVRLQIOXHQWLDOLQWKHDQWL-µVZHDWLQJ¶PRYHPHQWVRIWKHV
Beatrice and Sidney Webb attested in their monumental Industrial Democracy in 
1902 that: 
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 See Arthur McIvor, Working Lives: Work in Britain since 1945 (Basingstoke, 2013), 183. 
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 )UDQFLV'HYLQHµ6DIHW\+HDOWKDQG:HOIDUHDW:ork in the Irish Free State and the Republic of 
Ireland, 1922-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In the trade union world of today, there is no subject on which workmen of 
all shades of opinion, and all varieties of occupation, are so unanimous, 
and so ready to take combined action, as the prevention of accidents and 
the provision of healthy workplaces.8 
Nonetheless, actual occupational health and safety strikes to protect the body, as 
opposed to jobs and wages, are elusive. This appears to have not been an explicit 
cause of any major industry-wide or national strikes in the UK. If one thinks of 
the great strike waves of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries, health, the 
body and safety issues are not fore-grounded as causes or issues, or at least as 
primary causes. This was even the case with the 1968-74 strike-waves when 
unions were at the peak of their power in the UK and Ireland. As issues causing 
strikes, health and safety simply do not register as significant. This does not merit 
a mention, for e[DPSOHLQ'XUFDQ0F&DUWK\DQG5HGPDQ¶V comprehensive 
survey of strikes over 1946-RULQ&KXUFKDQG2XWUDP¶VTXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVRI
strikes and militancy in coal mining during 1889-1966.9 Drilling down and 
disaggregating the official UK strike statistics further than undertaken in these 
studies might, however, reveal a pattern of occupational health and safety strikes. 
This would be a worthwhile exercise. However, as with the USA, it is likely to 
demonstrate the small number of such incidences. That said, such issues may well 
have been more prevalent as underlying grievances, with wages and jobs more 
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 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy (London, 1902), 357. 
9
 J. W. Durcan, W. E .J. McCarthy and G.P. Redman, Strikes in Post-War Britain, 1946-73 (1983); 
Church and Outram, Miners and Militancy. 
evident as primary causes because these were areas where workers were most 
liable to be more readily mobilised. Discourses of health, fatigue and entitlement 
to well-being were sometimes evident, but muted in the major strikes. The 
apparent invisibility of health and safety strikes may hide a more complex reality. 
Some commentators have developed the argument that trade unions 
neglected occupational health and safety ± or at least prioritised wages, job 
security and compensation over protecting the body, addressing threats to health 
and championing prevention through improving work environments and 
developing really effective regulatory regimes.10 By not providing an effective 
µFRXQWHUYDLOLQJIRUFH¶LWLVDUJXHGWKLVHQDEOHGSUREOHPVJHQHUDWHGE\SURILW-
maximising corporate enterprises to persist.11  The argument here is that much 
more could have been done, earlier and more aggressively by the unions, to 
protect workers bodies. John Williams in Accidents and Ill Health at Work, 
published in 1960, criticised the trade unions in Britain for lacking a clear 
DFFLGHQWSUHYHQWLRQSROLF\GHFODULQJµ:LWKLQZKDWOLPLWVFDQWKHFRPPXQLW\
tolerate the introduction of sDIHW\VWDQGDUGVE\QHJRWLDWLRQLQVORZPRWLRQ¶12 
Whilst noting the importance of trade union activities on compensation, the 
Factory Acts and the campaign to get joint safety committees, Williams criticised 
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 See Beaumont, Safety at Work, 42; Mass Observation, People in Production (1942), 203. 
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 $V7ZHHGDOHKDVDUJXHGLQUHODWLRQWRWUDGHXQLRQVDQGDVEHVWRVLQKLVVWXG\RIWKH8.¶VPDLQ
asbestos multi-national: Tweedale, Magic Mineral. 
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 John L. Williams, Accidents and Ill Health at Work (London, 1960), 341. 
ZKDWKHVDZDVµDQDUURZDSSURDFK¶ZKLFKGLGQRWIRFXVRQSUHYHQWLRQ13 In his 
500 page book there is not a single reference to an occupational health and safety 
strike. Graham Wilson also commented in The Politics of Safety and Health in 
1985: µHealth and safety at work have mattered comparatively little to unions in 
%ULWDLQDVLQWKH86$«2QO\DPLQRULW\RIXQLRQRIILFHUVDQGRIILFLDOVKDYH
shown passionate concern for safety and health at work¶.14 
 In relation to Scotland, trade union inertia and inaction on health and 
safety has been identified in studies of the health and safety of dockers before the 
Second World War and in relation to the asbestos tragedy.15 William Kenefick has 
argued that before the Second World War, Glasgow dockers were more likely to 
VWULNHIRUDZDJHSUHPLXPµGLUW\¶RUµGDQJHU¶PRQH\WKDQWRGRZQWRROVUHIXVLQJ
WRKDQGOHWR[LFSURGXFWV+HDUJXHVµ)RUWKHGRFNHUVWUDGHXQLRQLVPZDVPRUH
closely linked to gaining preference in employment, and to protecting jobs from 
RXWVLGHUVWKDQFRQFHUQVRYHUVDIHW\«6DIHW\ZDVDQRQ-issue along the Glasgow 
ZDWHUIURQW¶16 There are also fragments of oral evidence that corroborate such a 
negative view of trade union inaction in Scotland right up to the last quarter of the 
twentieth century. For example, a Scottish occupational health consultant Robin 
Howie postulated in an oral interview in 2001: 
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 Ibid., 343-4. 
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 Graham Wilson, The Politics of Safety and Health (1985), 114. 
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 See Ronald Johnston and Arthur McIvor, Lethal Work (East Linton, 2000). 
16
 William Kenefick, Rebellious and Contrary: The Glasgow Dockers, 1853-1932 (East Linton, 
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There are unions which are the exception to the rule, but in my own 
experience trade unions have not been as concerned about things like 
health and safety as they are about the fact the job is still there and what 
WKHZDJHUDWHVDUH« 
,EODPHWKHWUDGHXQLRQVWRDODUJHH[WHQW«'XULQJWKHVZHKDGD
series of wage freezHVWKDW¶VZKHQWKHXQLRQVVKRXOGKDYHEHHQJRLQJIRU
EHWWHUFRQGLWLRQV7KH\FRXOGQ¶WJRIRUPRQH\WKH\FRXOGKDYHJRQHIRU
better conditions, for better safety in the workplace and they chose not 
to.17 
Similarly, a communist Ayrshire coal miner and union activist, Alec Mills, 
declared in an interview in June 2000: µ$QJU\$QJU\«:HQHYHUZHQWRQVWULNH
for masks. But we should have went on strike for masks. A lot of men would be 
alive today if they had been provided with masks¶.18     
The current President of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) - Nicky 
Wilson - ODPHQWHGUHFHQWO\WKDWZKLOVWWKHPLQHUV¶XQLRQLQ6FRWODQGKDGIRFXVHG
on prevention and compensation relating to physical ill-health, historically they 
had neglected the psychological impacts of disability and work-related deaths 
which he equated as forms of post-traumatic stress disorder.19   
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 Robin Howie, interviewed by Neil Rafeek, 20 September 2001 (SOHC Archive 017/C45). 
18
 Alec Mills, b 1933, interviewed by Arthur McIvor and Ronald Johnston, 19 June 2000 (SOHC 
017/C1). 
19
 Nicky Wilson at the Mining Disability Witness Seminar, SOHC, University of Strathclyde, 28 
April 2014 (SOHC Archive). 
The unions have thus had a bit of a bad press when it comes to 
occupational health and safety, being regarded as having failed members, of 
trading jobs and wages for health, of not devoting enough resources to 
campaigning on health and the body. To this we might add, at least at first sight, 
that the trade unions failed to make full and effective use of the strike weapon (at 
least at industry and national level) as a deterrent or as leverage to minimise the 
damage to the body through trauma or chronic occupational disease. A key point 
here is that occupational health and safety was framed early on in the nineteenth 
FHQWXU\LQDVWDWXWRU\VHWWLQJZLWKµSUHYHQWDWLYH¶OHJLVODWLRQ (Factory Acts; Mines 
Acts)DQGLPSRUWDQWO\ZLWKWKHSDVVDJHRIµQRIDXOW¶:RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ
legislation from the 1890s. Strategically, trade union activity became focussed on 
this level ± campaigning and lobbying to extend statutory protection and legal 
rights, with its responsibilities expanding as time went on ± for example with the 
appointment of its Medical Advisers, Thomas Legge from 1931, then Hyacinth 
Morgan.20  
That said, strikes against increased workloads (for example at Singer, 
Clydebank in 1911), the anti-Bedaux strikes in the 1920s and 19VDQGWKHµPRUH
ORRPV¶VWULNHVRIWKHHDUO\VZHUHGLUHFWHGH[SOLFLWO\DJDLQVWZRUN
intensification and resultant fatigue and overstrain. The sustained campaigns and 
strike action to reduce working hours and increase holidays with pay might also 
be seen in this light. They were articulated within a discourse that incorporated the 
alienation of bodies under closer supervision and surveillance (including medical 
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monitoring), the need for the body to recuperate, the concept of fatigue and the 
LGHDRIDµKHDOWK\¶ZRUN-life balance: necessary for mental as well as physical 
health. The trade unions were central to campaigns against unhealthy work 
conditions, from the National Federation of Women Workers campaigning on 
lead poisoninJWRWKHFRDOPLQLQJXQLRQ¶VFKDOOHQJHWRRUWKRGR[PHGLFDO
discourses on dust disease in the 1930s which led to the scheduling of coal 
ZRUNHUV¶SQHXPRFRQLRVLVLQ0RUHRYHUWKH7UDGHV8QLRQ&RQJUHVV78&
and Scottish Trades Union Congress campaigns on tuberculosis (as part of a wider 
medical-SROLWLFDOµSURJUHVVLYHDOOLDQFH¶ resulted ultimately in it being officially 
recognised as an occupational disease (in 1951).21 Strikes, however, did not 
feature at all in these campaigns.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, however, we do begin to see evidence of strike 
activity on health and safety issues. This was in part a product of a more health-
oriented society as the environmental movement gathered momentum and in part 
a consequence of the shifting balance of power and assertiveness of trade unions. 
As plant level bargaining proliferated, health and safety became greater priorities 
for the growing numbers of shop stewards who worked in industry ± as the 
Donovan Commission in 1968 reported. Unfortunately we know little about the 
role of shop stewards in health and safety during this period ± a subject that merits 
further investigation, which would be facilitated by a systematic oral history 
project. As Philip Beaumont has shown, however, union pressure led to the 
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 See Arthur McIvor, µ*HUPVDWZRUN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establishment of joint health and safety committees across many industries in the 
1960s and these played a significant role in raising occupational health and safety 
standards.22 Precursors flourished briefly during Second World War when the 
Joint Production Committees frequently embraced health and safety functions. By 
the 1970s these joint health and safety committees were shored up by an extension 
of such provision in the Health and Safety at Work Act. This increased focus on 
the reform of statutory provision for health and safety in the 1970s appears to 
have been paralleled by a surge in direct action. Beaumont surveyed 225 trade 
union health and safety officers across different industries in Glasgow in 1979 and 
around twenty per cent reported they had witnessed industrial action on health and 
safety in the previous year.23   
Oral Labour History, Strikes and the Body at Work 
Oral evidence provides a lens through which lived experience can be 
reconstructed, acting as a barometer of prevailing discourses, attitudes and 
emotions relating to the body at work, as well as elucidating the agency of 
workers regarding threats to health in the workplace. One period when 
occupational health risks were significantly heightened in Scotland was the 
Second World War, especially during the period of crisis following Dunkirk.24 
However, this does not appear to have resulted in significant strike action to 
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 Beaumont, Safety at Work, 59-60. 
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 Ibid., 101-2. 
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 See Ronald Johnston and $UWKXU0F,YRUµ7KH:DUDW:RUN2FFXSDWLRQDO+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\LQ
Scottish Industry, 1939-¶Journal of Scottish Historical Studies, 2 (2005), 113-36. 
SURWHFWZRUNHUV¶ERGLHVScottish docker and union activist Tom Murray 
scathingly criticised the unwillingness of the TGWU to support strike action to 
protect dockers exposed to dangerous chemicals at Leith docks in 1941-2.25 In 
wartime strikes were technically illegal, under Order 1305, but that did not stop 
them happening and with some frequency, especially in the mines and 
shipyards.26 These strikes pivoted around challenges to skilled status with 
µGLOXWLRQ¶DQGSD\GLIIHUHQWLDOVDQGLQMXVWLFHVDVZLWKWKHHTXDOSD\VWULNH
led by Agnes Maclean at Rolls Royce in Hillington, Glasgow.27 Despite relatively 
high levels of strike activity compared to the 1930s, few wartime Reserved 
Occupation workers interviewed for a recent AHRC oral history research project 
could recall any strikes, never mind ones that were linked to health and safety.28 
Fairly typical was this response in an interview from Scottish railwayman William 
Mcnaul:  
Q. Was there any trade union action during the war, or strikes? 
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 Tom Murray¶VLQWHUYLHZWHVWLPRQ\LQIan MacDougall (ed.), Voices from Work and Home 
(Edinburgh, 2000), 287. 
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Clydeside: Men in Reserved Occupations During the Second World War (Edinburgh, 2016). 
$1R1RQRWKLQJOLNHWKDW:DVQ¶WDOORZHG «1RQRQR\RXGDUHQ¶WGR
anything like that.29  
The lack of strike activity in 1940s Scotland on health and safety issues 
should perhaps not surprise us, given that in wartime many Home Front workers 
were tolerating higher levels of risk in a context where they saw themselves as 
supporting combatants (family and friends) facing much greater dangers in 
uniform. Such hegemonic military masculinities needed to be matched with a 
patriotic commitment to maximising wartime production. Moreover, workers 
were assuaged by a wartime government that was markedly pro-labour and keen 
to directly address workplace health and safety issues through state welfarist 
initiatives, such as the compulsory employment of company doctors, welfare 
officers, canteens and other provisions, whilst playing down actual health risks (to 
maintain wartime morale) and prioritising production. At the centre of this was 
Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, who famously told asbestos insulation workers 
on Clydeside that he did not want any nonsense and rejected a call by the local 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) branch for an investigation into 
dusty conditions in asbestos insulation.30 In part, the erasure in oral testimonies 
regarding strikes in wartime might be connected to a sense on the part of such 
wartime home front narrators that striking was subversive to the national war 
effort and clashed with the ways they were composing their memories (and sense 
of self) in light of efforts to present a narrative that emphasised their contribution 
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 William Mcnaul interviewed by Linsey Robb, 27th March 2013 (SOHC Archive). 
30
 Alan Dalton, Asbestos: Killer Dust (London, 1979), 98. 
to war in a similar way to combatants: that is to place themselves within wartime 
hierarchies of masculinities that were headed by hegemonic military masculinity 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFRPEDWDQWV7KHµFRPSRVXUH¶RIPHPRULHVLQWHU-subjectivity, the 
cultural circuit, silences and misremembering are all key issues in oral history. 
Much has been done over recent years to develop the theory of oral history in 
these areas.31  
Oral history is a methodology which enables strikes generally and 
occupational health and safety strikes specifically to be explored through the lens 
of those who actually directly participated in them. This leads us closer to an 
emotional history of strikes and the everyday, lived experience of strikers and 
those who opposed them for that matter. They also tell us much about what trade 
unionism meant to workers at a personal level. In Scotland, there has been a long 
tradition in labour history of collecting such oral testimonies and blending these 
personal narratives into studies of industrial action and community struggles. Ian 
0DF'RXJDOO¶VZRUNVWDQGVRXWDVWKHSLRQHHUing oral historian in labour history.32 
The Oil Lives project in Aberdeen (headed by Terry Brotherstone and Hugo 
0DQVRQDQG-LP3KLOOLSV¶QXDQFHGUHFHQWPRQRJUDSKRQWKHPLQHUV¶
strike in Scotland which draws upon a series of oral interviews are other pertinent 
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examples.33 Other Scottish labour historians have used oral history methodology 
to elucidate industrial action, to write biographies of labour activists and, 
increasingly, to interrogate strike activity (or the lack thereof) and other 
resistance, such as sit-ins.34 $QRXWVWDQGLQJH[DPSOHZRXOGEH$QGUHZ3HUFKDUG¶V
work on the Scottish aluminium communities in Kinlochleven, Invergorden and 
Lochaber in Aluminiumville. Strikes were virtually unheard of in the tightly 
controlled paternalistic company communities in the Highlands, despite a cluster 
of worker grievances, including on health and safety issues. Alexander Walker, 
former Electrical TU shop steward who worked at the Lochaber power station 
between 1964 and 2001 commented: 
During my period in the power station in Lochaber, British Aluminium 
:RUNV,ZDVDYHU\VWURQJWUDGHXQLRQPDQ«:H had disputes with 
management and we always resolved them, because there was never any 
GDQJHURIXVJRLQJWRRIDUZKLFK,GRQ¶WWKLQNPDQDJHPHQWDWWKHWLPH
appUHFLDWHGEHFDXVHLWZDVQ¶WDMRELWZDVDFRPPXQLW\  
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 Terry Brotherstone and Hugo 0DQVRQµ1RUWK6HD2LOLWV1DUUDWLYHVDQGLWV+LVWRU\¶Northern 
Scotland, 27 (2007), 15-41; Jim Phillips, Collieries, Communities and the Miners' Strike in 
Scotland, 1984±85 (Manchester, 2012). 
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 For a recent example see Andrew Clark, µ³And the next thing, the chairs barricaded the door´: 
The Lee Jeans Factory Occupation, Trade Unionism and GHQGHULQ6FRWODQGLQWKHV¶, 
Scottish Labour History, 48 (2013), 116-34. 
+HFRQWLQXHGµWKHDOXPLQLXPLQGXVWU\ZDVDVDYLRXUWRWKH+LJKODQGV¶ 35 
Another strand of the oral labour history literature in Scotland has 
explored health and safety cultures on the job, focusing on the body in the 
workplace and how workers and their trade unions navigated threats to health and 
well-being.36 Again, health and safety strikes rarely, if ever, feature. This work to 
GDWHKDVSUHGRPLQDQWO\FRQFHQWUDWHGRQPDOHZRUNHUVLQWKHµKHDY\LQGXVWULHV¶
There remains much scope for research in the same vein for female workers.   
An oral history methodology has the potential then to add other 
dimensions to analyses of strikes ± not least facilitating a re-focused emotional 
history and the exploration of intersecting identities such as gender, race and 
class. It is almost axiomatic that labour history projects on the post-1950 period 
must incorporate interviewing. Oral history approaches can take us right to the 
point of production through the eyes of workers rather than reconstructing 
experience through the lens of written institutional sources. The methodology 
allows us to question and probe particular areas; to engage in a dialogue with the 
past. This enables the activities of work groups and trade unions to be elucidated, 
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 See Ronald Johnston and Arthur McIvor, Lethal Work (East Linton, 2000); McIvor and 
Johnston, 0LQHUV¶/XQJ; David Bradley, µOral History, Occupational Health and Safety in Scottish 
Steel, c1930-1988¶, Scottish Labour History, 46 (2011), 86-101; David Walker, µ³Danger was 
something you were brought up with´:RUNHUV¶1DUUDWLYHVRQ2FFXSDWLRQDO+HDOWKDQG6DIHW\LQ
the Workplace, Scottish Labour History, 46 (2011), 54-70.  
agency and structure to be evaluated, and, relating to the specific issue under 
scrutiny here, to shed light into occupational health and safety, as well as helping 
us to understand work-health cultures in the past. Oral history has its limitations 
of course and has to be utilised sensitively. New oral history interviewing projects 
can only go back as far as living memory, though in some cases previously 
undertaken and archived interviews are of considerable value.37 Whilst strong in 
Scotland, oral history is relatively insignificant in the labour history of Ireland, as 
EPPHW2¶&RQQRU¶VZRUNKDVVKRZn.38 The Irish Oral History Network was only 
established in 2010 and there remains some residual scepticism towards oral 
history in Irish academic history circles. Where oral history research 
methodologies have been most evident in Ireland has been in studies of the 
Troubles and nationalist politics.39 Exceptions include the work of Liam Cullinane 
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on working lives in Cork (which incorporates discussion about health and safety 
issues) and 6HDQ2¶&RQQHOORQWKH6DLORUWRZQFRPPXQLW\LQ%HOIDVW40 
Undercurrents of Resistance: Occupational Health and Safety Walkouts and 
µ:LOGFDWV¶ 
Oral evidence for Scotland reveals a subterranean matrix of resistance and direct 
action on health and safety, co-existing, sometimes uneasily, with consent, apathy 
and conformity to managerial authority and traditional forms of masculinity 
expressed in risk-taking. This is evident, for example, in relation to asbestos. 
Given the significance of asbestos as a work-related hazard its reception by the 
trade unions and the extent to which direct action was utilised is significant. 
Historian Geoffrey Tweedale has argued that the trade union movement failed to 
act as an effective countervailing force and activists such as Alan Dalton have 
been critical of trade union inertia at the top level.41 In -RKQVWRQDQG0F,YRU¶V
book Lethal Work, the example of some STUC delegates contemptuously ripping 
up asbestos FDPSDLJQHUV¶ pamphlets in 1976 has been cited.42 The TUC was also 
very influenced by their incumbent Medical Adviser (1962-74), Robert Murray, 
who TXHOOHGZRUNHUV¶IHDUVE\GHFODULQJDVEHVWRVVDIHWRZRUNZLWKXQGHUFHUWDLQ
conditions and assuaged their growing anxieties as medical knowledge of a cancer 
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 Johnston and McIvor, Lethal Work, 166. 
risk developed in the 1960s. ThHVHµH[SHUW¶DVVXUDQFHV undoubtedly played a role 
in nipping some nascent industrial action on asbestos in the bud. Murray had a 
very condescending attitude towards workers exposed to such risks, famously 
FRPPHQWLQJRQRQHRFFDVLRQWKDWµZRUNHUVZRXOGSLFNXSDVEHVWRVZLWKWKHLU
WHHWKLIWKH\ZHUHSDLGHQRXJK¶43 By the 1970s there was also a strong pro-
asbestos group within the trade unions, headed by the TGWU, representing the 
interests of workers in asbestos manufacturing who wanted to protect their jobs.44 
This could leave workers ill-informed, confused and vulnerable. On Clydeside a 
number of oral interviews referred to this difficult environment from the 1960s 
through to the 1980s where the capacity of the trade unions to resist was limited 
or they lacked support from the union for local action. A Scottish asbestos 
insulation lagger recalled: 
Anytime you had a dispute or anything I found that if you tried to call 
them [TGWU officials] out they wouldnae come. So, what was going on 
was eh, just basically the guys on the job had to work it out for themselves 
whether they were going to do it or whether they wernae going to do it, 
you know. But, union help? Very disappointed with it.45  
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SOHC Archive 016/A16.  
Similarly, a heating engineer who was a member of the Heating Ventilation and 
$LU&RQGLWLRQLQJ:RUNHUV¶8QLRQUHFDOOHGWKDWKis small union did not have the 
strength to do much to improve worker health and safety in this period: 
To my knowledge there has only been one strike in the heating trade, and 
WKH\FRXOGQDHDIIRUG«7KH\WHUPHGLWDFDWFKVWULNH«7KH\RQO\FRXOG
take out so many firms or so many jobs. Say for talking sake there was eh, 
VD\VL[MREVLQYROYHGLQKHDWLQJLQWKHWRZQ:HOOWKH\¶GWDNHWKUHHRIWKDH
jobs out and the rest had to put a levy in to keep their wages up. The union 
hadnae enough money and the backing to support a full strike, you know, 
an all-out strike. So we had to work it on catch strikes, you know. And it 
only lasted, to my memory, I think it was three weeks, then we couldnae 
afford it after that. Packed it in. So the strike was just a no-go area.46 
This testimony speaks to the realities of disempowerment in a fragmented trade 
dominated by small sub-contracting insulation firms and the constraints on strike 
activity in this context. Another Clydeside asbestos lagger commented that health 
and safety disputes when they did arise could be settled by wage concessions or 
the agreement to pay extra bonuses as an incentive:  
It always seemed to be that you wanted a bit of extra cash and better 
conditions. But they sometimes gave you the extra cash and the conditions 
were back-heeled µFDXVHWKH\GLGQDHZDQWWRNQRZDERXWWKHP«7KDt 
was a lever used by the trade unions to get extra cash. Instead of pushing 
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  Interview (anon.), heating engineer b 1940 with Ronald Johnston, 22 December 1998, SOHC 
016/A6.  
for betWHUVDIHW\FRQGLWLRQV«$WWKDW time everybody knew asbestos 
caused all kinds of illnesses.47  
Here we see reference to the use of health and safety as a bargaining tool in 
informal trade-offs where risk would be absorbed in return for financial 
FRPSHQVDWLRQµ'DQJHUPRQH\¶RUµGLUWPRQH\¶FROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWVZHUH
negotiated by the unions and were condoned by the workmen affected to varying 
degrees. In heavy industry workplaces and in mines and construction sites a 
deeply acculturated macho work culture policed this behaviour for the immediate 
post-war generation of industrial workers.  
That said, there co-existed a significant and growing level of resistance to 
WKLVLGHDRIDQµDFFHSWDEOHOHYHORIULVN¶&ertainly many local activists and shop 
stewards were critical of national union leaderships and the STUC / TUC for what 
they perceived as a failure to support local health and safety disputes by making 
them official and providing strike pay. Rank and file activity spurned the 
constraints of official trade union policy and cultural indifference on the job and 
mobilised to expose the high death and disability toll of industrial work and to 
protect the body at work utilising a range of tactics, including direct strike action. 
Examples on Clydeside would be activists such as Hugh Cairney and John Todd 
and the campaigns of the local Glasgow branch of the insulation workers (laggers) 
affiliated to the TGWU (local 7/162) from the 1940s to the 1970s on asbestos. In 
two oral interviews in 1999 and in 2005 former local 7/162 branch secretary Hugh 
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Cairney reflected on how the Glasgow asbestos laggers got organised by the mid-
1950s and, with 100 per cent membership and a closed shop, initiated a series of 
health and conditions strikes to raise environmental standards. They initially faced 
employer intransigence, typical of the more entrenched managerial 
authoritarianism and residual anti-unionism that characterised Clydeside. As 
&DLUQH\UHFDOOHGµ:KHQ,ILUVWVWDUWHGWKHERVVHVGLGQDHZDQWWRNQRZDQ\WKLQJ
DERRWXVRUWDONWRXV¶48  Another TGWU activist recalled how the Glasgow 
ODJJHUV¶EUDQFKKDGWRILJKWHYHQIRUEDVLFDPHQLWLHV 
There were no overalls. No boots.  And you were swallowing it [asbestos] 
all the time, and so was all the people that were working near you. But 
they had a hut where they made [asbestos] mats only in it. Nae extractor 
IDQRUQRWKLQJ«$WRQHWLPHZHGLGQDHKDYHDQ\KXWV:HKDGWRVLW
between decks on the ships. We had to go and fight for tae get a hut. You 
NQRZDQRUGLQDU\KXW$QGLQWKDWKXWZDVD¶WKHPDWHULDO$QG\RXZHUH
taking your tea during WKHPHDOEUHDNVDQGD¶WKDWPDWHULDO$QGHYHU\
part of the material had asbestos in it, a percentage.49 
Cairney stressed how the main µfighting strength¶ of the trade union was at local 
branch level:  
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:HOOLI\RX¶UHWDONLQJDERXWWKHXQLRQV,DOZD\VWKLnk the union is a 
mythical body. This branch done a lot. We happened to belong to a trade 
union. We fought « I mean, we walked the streets for twenty-six weeks to 
get conditions. We were the ones that forced them to give us tables and 
chairs to sit down to have a meal with. Made them give us a changing 
room to hang our clothes up.50 
:KHQ DVNHG µ:DV LW KDUG EULQJLQJ LQ KHDOWK DQG VDIHW\ LQWR WKH MRE"¶ &DLUQH\
UHSOLHGµ,WZDVDWWKHVWDUWyes. We always nearly had to hit the gates to get any 
health and safet\QRWQRRZHGDHEXWWKHQD\H¶&DLUQH\VSRNHHORTXHQWO\LQWKH
language of solidarity and VRFLDOMXVWLFHDERXWSURWHFWLQJKLVPHPEHUV¶ERGLHV 
When we came, when we took action it was every lagger. We didnae just 
say we worked for a firm called Millers, we had a dispute in Grangemouth 
with Millers, we called oot everybody that worked in MillersGLGQ¶WPDWWHU
whether they were in Grangemouth whether they were working in 
Saltcoats or ± you hit the company, right?  Everybody.  So companies had 
to come doon and talk to you. I mean we werenae actually bully boys, we 
MXVWZDQWHGZKDWZHWKRXJKWZHZHUHHQWLWOHGWR:H¶UHHQWLWOHGWREHDEOH
WRZDVKRXUKDQGVZH¶UHHQWLWOHGWRWDNHoveralls that are covered with 
asbestos off and go and sit doon, have something to eat without wearing 
these dirty boiler suits.  So we brought they things in. In Grangemouth noo 
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everybody has changing rooms noo and that. So we caused an awful lot of 
it and it was all through health and safety.51 
$WDQRWKHUSRLQWLQWKHLQWHUYLHZKHUHWXUQHGWRWKHLVVXHRIµHQWLWOHPHQW¶ 
I mean we went on to a job, if the toilets were frozen, that was it<RX¶G
JLYHWKHPXQWLOWHQR¶FORFNLIWKH\ZHUHQDHXQEORFNHGDQGFOHDQHGRRW
oot the gate and away. And see when we come back the next day? They 
were fixed but we wouldnae start work until we were paid for that day, 
WKLQJVOLNHWKDW:HZHUHTXLWHULJKW,PHDQLIVRPHERG\¶VJRWWRJRWRWKH
toilet \RX¶UHHQWLWOHGWRJRWRWKHWRLOHW DQGLW¶VWKHLUMREWRPDLQtain it and 
make sure the toilets were clean and working and that.52 
&DLUQH\¶VQDUUDWLYHLVLQWHUHVWLQJDWDQXPEHURIOHYHOVDSDUWIURPZKDWKHUHYHDOV
about rank and file activism, including strikes, on health and safety issues. This is 
an archetypal emotive activist narrative, transposing the heroic role of the union 
EUDQFKLQWKHVWUXJJOHWRSURWHFWERGLHVDJDLQVWWKHµYLOODLQV¶± both complicit (the 
employers and managers) and implicit (the union hierarchy in the TGWU). Later 
the Glasgow TGWU 7/162 branch supported an unofficial month-long strike at 
Newalls Insulation in 1966 for masks, protective clothing and medical exams.53 
The TGWU and STUC offered no support and the STUC eventually banned local 
activist John Todd from its Health and Safety training schools because of his 
outspoken criticism of TGWU inaction on asbestos. Other unofficial action 
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followed, as with London dockers blacking asbestos handling in 1967 and 
EXLOGLQJZRUNHUV¶VWULNHVDJDLQVWDVEHVWRVDQGDVEHVWRVVXEVWLWXWHVLQWKHV
(for example, the Isle of Grain power station strike for nine months in 1976 
DJDLQVWWKHXVHRIJODVVILEUH7KLVµSUDLULHILUH¶RIKHDOWKVWULNHVVSUHDGWRWKHRLO
refineries, including Grangemouth, in the later 1970s.  
The 1970s appear to be a watershed with a cluster of significant 
occupational health and safety strikes. In relation to asbestos in Scotland, the 
Glasgow laggers branch of the TGWU led the way, with a series of strikes which 
achieved reforms in health and safety, craft status and wage rates which English 
areas were struggling to achieve parity with in the 1970s.54 Here were ripples of a 
ORQJWUDGLWLRQRIUDQNDQGILOHUDGLFDOLVPRQµ5HG&O\GHVLGH¶ZKLFKXQGRXEWHGO\
shaped this more assertive phase of direct action on health and safety. This was 
also a quite unique mobilisation which drew strength from the close kinship and 
ethnic links of Irish Catholics amongst the asbestos lagging workers in Glasgow. 
Activists in the 7/162 Glasgow branch also went on to form the community 
advocacy and pressure group Clydeside Action on Asbestos (CAA) in 1986, a 
voluntary organisation that represented victims and campaigned for legislative 
reform, with much success in the new Scottish devolved parliament from 1999. 
&$$ZDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIGLVHDVHGDQGLQMXUHGZRUNHUV¶PRYHPHQWVWKDW
                                                          
54
 Hugh Cairney interviewed by Neil Rafeek, 26 March 2005, SOHC Archive 016/A35. 
emerged across developed economies in the later twentieth century to challenge 
economic violence in the workplace and environmental pollution.55 
Where trade union levels were relatively high and labour markets buoyant 
LQµGDQJHURXVWUDGHV¶there was a SDWWHUQRIµZLOGFDW¶VWULNHVDQGZDONRXWVRQ
occupational health issues at a local level in the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, on closer 
scrutiny it was not WKDWZRUNHUV¶failed to go out on strike on health and safety 
issues, rather that these strikes were short and often unofficial, hence less visible, 
slipping under the radar. Oral interviews reveal this hidden world of subterranean 
conflict and resistance around the body and its exploitation at the point of 
production. Witness, for example, the testimony of Scottish shipbuilding worker 
John Keggie recalling the 1960s and 1970s: 
%\DQGODUJHPRVWR¶WKHGLVSXWHVLQ5REE¶V>VKLS\DUG@ZHUHDERXWKHDOWK
and safety issues. They were not really about arguments about money or 
wages, terms and conditions. They were about health and safety issues, 
where management under pressure to complete orders would try and put 
people into environments that were unsafe. And the workers would refuse 
and the management would then suspend an individual and one individual 
EHLQ¶ VXVSHQGHG«$KPHDQ DK UHPHPEHURQFH WKUHH - maself and two 
others - ZHUH DVNHG WDH JR LQWDH D WDQN WKDW ZDV XQVDIH DQG GLGQ¶W KDYH
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ventilation. We refused and were suspended. The entire shipyard 
workforce walked out and a thirteen-week dispute took place.56  





both have meaning and credibility in that one was recounting workplace struggle, 
agency and activism and the other a relative failure of trade union bureaucracies 
to support such radicalism and direct action. That is not to say the trade union 
hierarchy was indifferent to economic violence meted out against the body at 
work, rather that tactics diverged. At the national union level and at the STUC and 
TUC, campaigns were directed towards influencing policy and legislation, as the 
work of Vicky Long has shown.57  TKHLQMXUHGDQGGLVHDVHGZRUNHUV¶PRYHPHQW
was multi-layered, demonstrating that workers and their unions were also agents 
in this process at the point of production and not just passive victims.  At the 
workplace and local level, workers and their unions mobilised and could and did 
resort to the strike weapon and other forms of direct action to protect their bodies.  
Health Walkouts in Coal Mining 
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This pattern of local activism on health and safety was also evident in the Scottish 
coal mines, characterised as they were by very high incidences of injury, accident 
mortality and chronic industrial disease ± most importantly associated with 
inhalation of dust, causing pneumoconiosis, bronchitis and emphysema. Miners 
downed tools and walked out if safety was compromised or environmental 
conditions were deemed too risky and hazardous to health. These protests were 
limited, however, to seam or pit level strikes. They could occur at even the most 
inauspicious times and places ± DVZLWKWKHµGXVWVWULNH¶DWWKH)LIH&RDO
&RPSDQ\¶V0DU\3LW+HUHLQDPRGHUQDQWKUDFLWHFROOLHU\DµZHOIDULVW¶FRPSDQ\
with a relatively good safety policy) employing 1,300 men new coal cutting 
technology threw up large clouds of dust at the coalface. In response, the men 
affected walked out on strike in spite of unprecedented high levels of regional 
unemployment in the Fife coalfield at this high point of the interwar Depression. 
In an interview one of the 1932 strike participants recalled: 
Ye couldnae see one another «,W wis bad. It wis bad. You couldnae see if 
WKHFRDOFDPHRYHURQ WKH ORDGHUV«$QGDKPHDQ WKHGXVWZLVVREDG
you couldnae get it oot your eyes. We used tae pit margarine roond oor 
eyes, ye ken. The best thing ye could do wis if ye fell asleep, ye ken. Once 
ye wakened up and it wisnae sae bad. The coal dust used tae form in your 
eyes here. It wis bad, it really wis bad.58  
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Interestingly, in this case this miner ± John Taylor ± commented that direct action 
may nRWKDYHEHHQWKHEHVWWDFWLFWRDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHUHIOHFWLQJµBut, ah mean, it 
wis a wrong fight, ye ken. It could have been negotiated, ah think, better than 




come up the road [strike]. Ver\RIWHQ,KDGWRSKRQH7RPDQGWKH\¶GFRPHXSWKH
road because of the dust. They got more educated towards the end like. Years ago 
WKHFROOLHUVMXVWJRWRQZLWKLW¶61 Nati Thomas suggested in this last comment that 
the risk acceptance threshold and strike propensity on health issues differed 
markedly across generations and over time in mining. Older workers were 
socialised into living with poor environmental conditions underground. As an 
alternative to striking there was the work to rule option, as Scots miner Tommy 
Coulter explained: 
By that time the dust suppression awareness was there and, see prior to that if 
we knew, we knew the rules but if when we operated the rules we didnae get 
any dough [money]. But when the management were acting the goat we 




 John Jones, b 1934, interviewed by Susan Morrison, 15 September 2002, SOHC Archive 
017/C27. 
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 Colin (Nati) Thomas, b 1940, interviewed by Arthur McIvor and Ronnie Johnston, 12 May 
2004, SOHC 017/C26. 
respoQGHGZL¶DJRVORZRUDFDFDQQ\:KDWWKH\FDOOLQIDFWRULHVZRUNWRUXOH
DQGLWMXVWGLGQ¶WJR62 
Capacities, political cultures and the will to resist varied considerably across the 
coalfields and even from pit to pit ± as the work of Roy Church and Quentin 
Outram has shown.63 Place was significant. Whereas Scottish and Welsh miners 
might initiate direct action on health and safety issues, those in the Midlands were 
as likely to tolerate unhealthy work environments. Work-health cultures varied 
widely across different places, as this following dialogue between two Scottish 
miners and interviewer, Neil Rafeek reveals: 
*%,WKLQNLW¶VIDLUWRVD\WKLV,Q6FRWODQGZHKDGDGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKIURP
the NUM to safety and health and the rest of it. See down South, down South, 
(gasp XQEHOLHYDEOH« Much worse. I mean there were men cutting without 
ZDWHU«,ZRUNHGLQ6WRNH±on±7UHQWLWZDVEORRG\DZIXO«WKHPHQZHUHRQ
their own and men are very fearless on their own. Me, I worked in a stone mine 
with the blast borers for the drills ± no water.  Mining with dust often with a 
low boring machine ± µ.HHS JRLQJ -RFN \RXNQRZ come on, come on keep 
JRLQJ -RFN¶, shocking stuff.  Through a middle cut machine, no water. You 
imagine a machine up there [motioned to head height] throwing all the dust 
out.   
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NR: Just what you said there about keeping on working, why was that part of 
the culture do you think? 
GB: It was just the lack of good trade union, how things developed. 
DC: I would say money at the end of the day. 
GB: There was money but there was also a bad culture. In Stoke±on±Trent, the 
men werenae, they were not union conscious. I remember working on a road, 
went out on strike one day, see when the place turned ± other men doing the 
job for us (laughs « WKDW ZRXOGQ¶W KDSSHQ LQ 6FRWODQG EXW LW KDSSHQHG LQ
Stoke on Trent and elsewhere in England. Different approach to trade 
unionism. 7KDW DSSOLHV WR <RUNVKLUH WRR DSSDUHQWO\ WKH\¶UH QRW DV FOHYHU DV
WKH\ WKRXJKW WKH\ ZHUH 7KH\¶UH YHU\ FOHver in Scotland and I think also in 
South Wales to some extent, from what I know of it, union conscious, safety 
conscious, dust conscious ± really, really conscious. So that difference 
applied.64   
:KLOVWWKLVµKHURLF¶story-telling might have exaggerated the differences between 
Scots and English miners, the narratives of George Bolton and Derek Carruthers 
on health and safety do resonate with what we know about deep differences 
between work and political cultures across coalfields in the UK. Scots were 
amongst those more likely to resort to the strike weapon to defend workplace 
environmental standards. Workplace and community solidarity in Scotland 
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underpinned such action, in contrast to elsewhere (eg the English Midlands 
coalfield).  
 The 1984-5 miners¶VWULNH marked a watershed in many ways. It left the 
NUM shackled with all kinds of new µFRGHRIFRQGXFW¶UXOHVUHVWULFWLQJLQGXVWULDO
action. Excluded from this pernicious attack on trade union rights though was 
health and safety. Strikes on that issue proliferated over the following decade, as a 
North East England NUM activist Alan Napier recalled.65 Oral testimony is 
insightful at many levels but not least in demonstrating that when and where trade 
unions were powerful ± as in post-Second World War coal mining in Scotland ±
they were capable of initiating and supporting health and safety strikes, albeit at 
the local level. Miners may have been inured to high levels of danger and worked 
in an environment where manliness was equated with risk acceptance, but when 
this became apparent and excessive they became intolerant of exposure to risk, 
PRUHµVDIHW\FRQVFLRXV¶DQGPRUHZLOOLQJWRZDONRXWWRSURWHFWWKHLUERGLHV2YHU
time, this risk threshold shifted and workers became less willing to accept that 
high levels of death and disability were an intrinsic part of the work. 
On the other hand the NUM continued to support historic µGXVWPRQH\¶
bonus payments as an incentive to work in unhealthy environments and were 
sensitive to threats of pit closures and the need to weigh job losses against health 
and safety concerns. Industrial work could and did damage bodies, but so too did 
unemployment and in the context of deindustrialisation and sharply diminishing 
job opportunities trade-offs ZHUHPDGHWKDWVDFULILFHGPLQHUV¶KHDOWK and safety. 
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Hence, on occasions the NUM lived with non-compliance of dust standards where 
pit closure was threatened and officially at least wildcat strike action was censured 
± as, for example, in the decade or so following nationalisation. As the NUM 
3UHVLGHQW:LOO/DZWKHUVWDWHGLQµ,WLVDFULPHDJDLQVWRXURZQSHRSOHWKDW
unofficial strikes should take SODFH¶66 Clearly there were tensions between rank 
and file workplace protest ± including strikes ± and the wider strategies of union 
OHDGHUVDQGEXUHDXFUDFLHV7KLVZDVDOVRH[SUHVVHGLQWKH6RXWK:DOHVPLQHUV¶
abhorrence towards MLQHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQRI*UHat Britain and NUM support for 
µGXVW¶DQGµGLUW¶PRQH\FROOHFWLYHO\EDUJDLQHGDJUHHPHQWV± which one local 
RIILFLDOGHVFULEHGDVµRUJDQLVHGPXUGHU¶67 
Putting this in Perspective 
Oral evidence enables us to better understand the cultural and emotional 
landscape navigated by workers, and the resources that could be deployed in the 
mobilisation of workers on occupational health and safety issues. This suggests, at 
least in the 1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, the existence of a significant, 
organic, subterranean rank and file movement to protect bodies at work. In this, 
strikes (and the threat of strikes) were part of the arsenal of weapons used as 
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leverage on managers and employers to make concessions and to re-envisage 
ZRUNHUV¶ERdies as worthy of protection. Worker responses and agency regarding 
the body at work ± including strike action - was dependent, however, upon a 
number of variables. Legislation, such as the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, 
heightened awareness and legitimised industrial action. On the other hand 
deindustrialisation undermined the capacity to mobilise in defence of bodies at 
work and diverted trade union¶s attention towards what were almost universally 
regarded in working class communities to be more important priorities ± 
maintaining wages and jobs in the face of factory and mine closures and neo-
liberal policies designed to neuter trade unionism. David Gee, a General and 
0XQLFLSDO:RUNHUV¶8QLRQ+HDOWKDQd Safety officer noted in 1982 µ$VEHVWRV
workers could choose to settle for a one in 1000 risk, but that would mean closing 
GRZQWKHDVEHVWRVLQGXVWU\WRPRUURZ¶68 In 1979 the Scottish Secretary of the 
7*:8LQGLFDWHGWKDWUDWKHUWKDQLPSOHPHQWLQJWKH78&¶VSURSRVDOVIRUSKDVLQJ
out the use of asbestos, the Scottish TGWU was committed to maintaining 
HPSOR\PHQWRIDVEHVWRVZRUNHUVEXWµZRXOGORRNDIWHUWKHIDPLOLHVRf those 
PHPEHUVZKRVXIIHUIURPDVEHVWRVGLVHDVHDVDUHVXOW¶69 
Privatisation and the accelerated shift to the market in the 1980s and 1990s 
brought more pressures ± manifest, for example, in rising levels of work-related 
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injuries and disease, including the epidemic of work-related stress.70 In this 
context only major disasters such as Piper Alpha in 1988 (with the deaths of 167 
workers caused by lax safety regimes under largely US management in North Sea 
Oil) could mobilise workers to refocus on directly protecting bodies. As Gregor 
Gall has noted there were nineteen successful brief rolling strikes and sit-ins 
organised in the North Sea oilfield by the new industrial union (OILC) after the 
explosion, including a major strike involving around 4,000 workers on the first 
anniversary of Piper Alpha. Industrial action continued into 1990. The disaster 
was an epiphany. µ3LSHUIXQGDPHQWDOO\FKDQJHGWKHFRQVFLRXVQHVVRIZRUNHUV¶
*DOOKDVDVVHUWHGµQRWRQO\KDGµHQRXJKEHFRPHHQRXJK¶EXWUHDGLQHVVWR
confront the ePSOR\HUVZLWKZLGHVSUHDGVWULNHDFWLRQHPHUJHG¶71  
Still, occupational health and safety strikes were localised and even in the 
most dangerous and heavily unionised industries such as coal mining, oil 
extraction and shipbuilding tended to be confined to workplace level disputes. 
How can these relatively low levels of industrial action be explained? Why was 
there a reluctance to ramp health and safety issues up from the workplace / local 
level to regional, industry-wide and national strikes? For many unions this was a 
question of strategic choice. State intervention in the nineteenth century created a 
pattern of campaigning and lobbying for legislative reform to enforce preventative 
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action ± for example through Factory Acts, Mines Acts and Home Office Special 
5HJXODWLRQVVXFKDVWKRVHSHUWDLQLQJWRµGDQJHURXVWUDGHV¶VXFKDVOHDG
poisoning. This became a key role of the TUC and the STUC and its importance 
was recognised with the appointment of the Medical Advisers to the TUC. The 
first, Thomas Legge in 1931, was followed by Hyacinth Morgan who played an 
important role in getting TB scheduled as an occupational disease in 1951.72 Dave 
Lyddon has made the point that: 
A strike is very important in drawing attention to, and can be successful in 
resolving, an immediate occupational health problem - but its necessarily 
temporary nature is no substitute for the eventual implementation and 
continuous enforcement of legal regulations to control a particular 
hazard.73 
However, the failure to deploy strikes more widely on occupational health 
and safety was also a reflection of a macho work-health culture where maximising 
HDUQLQJVDQGWDNLQJULVNVZDVH[DOWHGDQGRYHUO\µSURWHFWLYH¶IRUPVRIEHKDYLRXU
pilloried as effeminate7KHKHJHPRQLFµKDUGPDQ¶PDVFXOLQLW\WKDWSHUPHDWHd the 
UHODWLYHO\GDQJHURXVµKHDY\LQGXVWULHV¶ZKHUHPHQZHUHVRFLDOLVHGLQWRKLJKOHYHOV
of danger and risk and inured to injury and death on the job was implicated here. 
As mentioned elsewhere, men had to be seen as acting as men and peer pressure 
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to conform could be brutal in working class communities like Clydeside.74 John L. 
Williams observed in his detailed (500 page) study of accidents in 1960:  
Fundamentally, the old attitude that the risk of the job must be accepted 
remains; although, as in other groups exposed to danger, the individual 
hopes and assumes he will not be involved. Even if some would want to 
object to certain dangers they may be influenced by concern that 
FROOHDJXHVPD\WDNHDFULWLFDOYLHZRIWKHLUµZHDNQHVV¶7KHVHIDFWRUV
explain, for example, the reluctance of many workers to wear or demand 
goggles in processes obviously risky to their eyes.75  
A concerned Safety Officer in Scott Lithgows shipyard on the Clyde reflected in 
µ6RPHKRZZHKDYHWRSHUVXDGHSHRSOHWRWDNHDVDIH attitude to their work. 
,WLVHDVLHUVDLGWKDQGRQH«LQDWUDGLWLRQDOLQGXVWU\OLNHVKLSEXLOGLQJZKHUHmen 
are set in their ways¶76 The question and the response from Ayrshire miner Alec 
Mills in an interview in 2000 is also revealing: 
AMcI: Why do you tKLQNWKHUHZDVQ¶WDVWULNHRQWKDWLVVXH>UHIHUULQJWR
masks and dust]?  
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AM: Well, the men as I say, if they had all been like myself, and had 
refused to work when they were firing shots on the return side. But the 
PHQZHUHQ¶WDOOEXLOWWKHVDPH7KH\ZHUHQ¶WDOOEXLOWWKHVDPH7KHUHZDV
unity within the coal mining industry and each individual pit if conditions 
were difficult, difficult, without the dust being brought into it. But there 
was never any argument about the dust.77 
When the same respondent talked about mechanisation generating more dust he 
UHIOHFWHGµ1RWKHUHZHUHQRVWULNHVRQFHPRUHIRUREYLRXVUHDVRQV7KHUHZHUH
LQFUHDVHGDQGHQKDQFHGSD\PHQWV¶78 In Mills narrative we see an explicit 
assertion that occupational health strikes were rare because workers were 
assuaged with compensatory wage payments. 
We need to understand the politics of the body within the labour 
movement in the context of prevailing workplace culture, power and the realities 
of lived, daily life. The latter is especially important. In an insecure, declining 
industry (mining employment peaked around 1920) located in communities where 
alternative employment opportunities were often limited the opportunity to earn 
extra wages for working in an unhealthy or hazardous environment was difficult 
to spurn. This applied also to the use of asbestos in the shipyards. Workers had 
low expectations regarding their own health because of the wider context of 
widespread poverty, overcrowding, morbidity and mortality that characterised 
cities such as Glasgow and deprived Scottish coal mining communities. In this 
context, the risks of industrial injury and chronic disease ± such as lead poisoning, 
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asbestos, silicosis and the like ± paled into insignificance. Work conditions might 
seem more tolerable when contrasted to teeming, overcrowded tenements; the risk 
of pneumoconiosis so distant in the future that the possibility of a job and decent 
wages clearly trumped such concerns. The room for manoeuvre was constrained 
by the realities of lived experience, the prevailing conditions in the labour market 
and the power of the bosses. This might be especially apposite in Scotland and the 
industrial heartland of West Scotland where a particularly entrenched anti-union, 
authoritarian managerial style prevailed. This was both endogenous and imported 
± a good e[DPSOHRIWKHODWWHUZKLFKKDGFDWDVWURSKLFHIIHFWVRQZRUNHUV¶ERGLHV
ZDV1RUWK6HD2LOZKHUHDODUJHO\$PHULFDQµJXQJ-KR¶VW\OHRIPDQDJHPHQW
prevailed which resulted in the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. Charles Woolfson, 
John Foster and Matthias Beck, along with Terry Brotherstone and Hugo Manson 
have analysed such developments, and oral history interviews in the Oil Lives 
project have elucidated both the high risk productionist managerial culture and the 
persistent militancy of the men in trying to neutralise these threats to their health 
and well-being.79 Deindustrialisation, plant and pit closures and declining union 
membership in the more hostile economic and neo-liberal political climate of the 
1980s and 1990s only made matters worse. Strike levels declined to all-time lows 
and there was little stomach for walkouts over health and safety amongst blue 
collar workers in a period when livelihoods were so directly under threat. The 
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strike of 4,000 workers over high stress levels in the Civil Service in November 
1999, half a century after the conflagration at Asbestos in Nova Scotia, was both 
an unusual outlier and a portent that the initiative in industrial action on the body 
at work was shifting from the traditional sectors of blue collar manual labour, and 
from physical damage to psycho-social aspects as Britain lurched towards a long-
hours and overwork culture in a predominantly service based economy.80  
Conclusion  
This paper has explored the evident invisibility of occupational health and safety 
strikes, offered tentative explanations as to why this was so and challenged the 
idea of worker quiescence and trade union inertia on the body at work through 
VRPHUHIOHFWLRQVRQWKHVXEWHUUDQHDQSDWWHUQRIODUJHO\XQRIILFLDOµZLOGFDW¶
walkouts on health and safety LQ6FRWODQG¶VµGDQJHURXVWUDGHV¶,WLVKRSHGWKDW
this will form the basis of further reflection, research and an on-going 
conversation on strikes and the body in the workplace. 
In Scotland, the relative lack of strike activity directly on health and safety 
issues for much of the twentieth century was connected both to fear of the 
consequences in a region where heavy industry employers were notoriously 
authoritarian and to the prevailing machismo working environment in which 
workers were socialised into taking high risks and tolerated high levels of danger. 
Historically, a high level of risk was accepted and regarded as compensated for in 
DKLJKHUZDJHDQGH[WUDµGDQJHUPRQH\¶SD\PHQWVWKDWSUHYDLOHGXSWRWKHHDUO\
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1970s. Consent and inertia were also the product of the wider context of 
deindustrialisation and job shedding (and concomitant labour disempowerment) 
and in part the result of a strategic prioritisation of campaigning and lobbying on 
occupational health and safety issues by national trade unions and the STUC and 
TUC. Occupational health and safety were framed by union leaderships as issues 
most appropriately and effectively pursued through legislation and state 
intervention. The latter were the main ways trade unions protected workers¶ 
bodies, though an important part was played by localised walkouts, which are 
probably more frequent than we might imagine, obscured by their poor visibility 
in aggregated metrics. Attitudes and capacities to mobilise were frequently in flux 
DQGLGHQWLWLHVPXWDWLQJRYHUWLPH+HJHPRQLFµKDUGPDQ¶VW\OHVRIPDVFXOLQLW\
were being superseded by a range of masculinities, if somewhat belatedly in the 
traditional working-FODVVFRPPXQLWLHVLQ6FRWODQG¶VLQGXVWULDOKHDUWODQGV:RUN-
health cultures, nonetheless, were changing. Dave Lyddon has made the important 
point that the later 1970s marked a watershed with the mass training by the TUC 
of health and safety representatives - around 80,000 attended trade union ten-day 
health and safety courses over 1974-82.81 Still, in the heavy industry 
manufacturing and mining workplaces that characterised Scotland until the last 
quarter of the twentieth century, workmen and their unions invariably continued 
to put jobs and wages before the direct protection of their bodies. This was 
perfectly logical in the circumstances. Jobs and wages were the key determinants 




of individual and family health and well-being ± and the deleterious impact of 
unemployment upon physical and mental health is well documented.82 In part at 
OHDVWWKLVZDVFRQQHFWHGWRµGRLQJPDVFXOLQLW\¶DQGEHLQJDµUHDOPDQ¶ZLWKLQZKDW
was still an intensely patriarchal and work-centred society into the 1970s and 
1V8QGHUVWDQGDEO\ZKHUHOLYHOLKRRGVDQGµEUHDGZLQQHU¶VWDWXVZHUH
threatened this was considered more important than occupational health and 
safety, and peer pressure to conform in such environments was powerful. Whether 
a more aggressive strike policy on health and safety would have achieved greater 
results and influenced the pattern of occupational health epidemics like asbestos 
and pneumoconiosis is debateable. What is evident is that this would have been 
going against the grain of an entrenched machismo work culture, where 
pragmatism, fatalism, conformity and a high risk threshold prevailed. 
That said, there was significant protest, resistance and advocacy around 
the body in the workplace environment, including through strikes, albeit at the 
local level. This rank and file direct action appears to have been growing and most 
prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s and is an aspect of the wider injured and 
GLVHDVHGZRUNHUV¶PRYHPHQWWKDWPHULWVPRUHDWWHQWLRQ7KHDUJXPHQWLQWKLV
essay is that workers¶ individual and collective responses on occupational health, 
safety and risk were complex and contingent, ranging across a spectrum 
depending upon a number of variables, influenced by prevailing power relations 
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and the wider social, economic and cultural context. It has been argued elsewhere 
that trade unions could be key interlocutors capable of acting, as one trade 
XQLRQLVWDVVHUWHGDVµFXVWRGLDQVRIZRUNHUV¶KHDOWK¶,WLV apparent that there was 
also more resistance through direct action, including withdrawal of labour, on 
health and safety than appears at first sight. An oral history approach can elucidate 
this, enabling exploration of the individual and collective responses of workers to 
risks of damage to their bodies ± their feelings, emotions, identities and lived 
experiences ± albeit often expressed in conflicting and multi-layered narratives 
that are difficult to interpret. Such personal testimonies can be especially 
revealing in exposing patterns of consent, mutating identities, as well as resistance 
WKURXJKµZLOGFDW¶VWULNHVVSRQWDQHRXVµZDONRXWV¶DQGRWKHUPHDQVWRDGGUHVV
threats to bodies at the point of production.  
